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Abstract 
This project continues ongoing efforts by the authors to understand 
transactions costs within DoD acquisition.  Past studies by the authors have been 
constrained by the data available.  As part of continuing effort to acquire more data 
and take advantage of first-hand knowledge of the issue, this study analyzes results 
from a survey of US Air Force Program Managers undertaken in 2008 by the 
National Research Council (NRC, 2009).   
The theoretical foundations of our supporting inquiry come from Transaction 
Cost Economics (TCE) and Agency Theory—well-established fields of study.  In 
particular, we are concerned with the complications and costs of dealing with 
partners both outside DoD (TCE) and within (Principal-Agent Problem).   
The number of oversight reviews has steadily increased, with increasingly 
higher-level involvement.  Accordingly, the resources and management attention 
devoted to these reviews has also increased.  Within that context, the NRC study 
attempted to assess program reviews with respect to value added and various costs 
incurred.  Our analysis of the survey results distinguishes between technical and 
programmatic reviews.  Technical reviews are conducted by the program manager 
(as principal) to monitor technical progress of the system contractors (agents).  
Programmatic reviews provide management oversight of the program manager (as 
agent) by higher-level authorities in DoD or Congress (principals). 
Our results suggest that program managers found some real value in some of 
their programmatic reviews, despite the common perception that reviews create 
excessive and burdensome levels of oversight.  In addition, we found that program 
mangers gave relatively less value to technical reviews, a result some might find 
counterintuitive. 
Keywords:  Acquisition, program management, transaction costs, principal-
agent, technical reviews, management oversight 
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I. Introduction 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) emphasizes transaction costs 
(coordination costs and motivation costs) in addition to traditional production costs 
and provides a useful framework for studying defense acquisition.  In this study, we 
focus on the costs of monitoring and oversight incurred by the program management 
process within the context of TCE and the principal-agent model (agency theory).   
We use data from a survey conducted by the National Research Council 
(NRC, 2009) to understand the costs and benefits of monitoring and oversight from 
the program manager’s perspective. In this NRC survey, program managers were 
asked to subjectively assess the impact/value of different programmatic and 
technical reviews.  We test the assumption that program managers are more likely to 
view technical reviews as less costly/more beneficial and view programmatic reviews 
as more costly/less beneficial. 
In the first section of this report, we present the basic theoretical foundations 
for our study: transaction cost economics and the principal-agent model.  We 
discuss efforts to measure transaction costs and the application of the principal-
agent model to the program manager’s role in the acquisition process.  Next, we 
discuss the program manager’s perspective in terms of program oversight and 
program reviews.  We conclude this section with a summary of the NRC study.  In 
the last section, we present the results of our analysis of the NRC survey data—
which yielded some counterintuitive results. 
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II. Theoretical Foundations 
A. Transaction Cost Economics 
Conventional economic analysis focuses on production costs (input costs, 
competition, learning curves, economies of scale and scope, etc.).  Coase (1937) 
was the first to ask why some firms produce goods and services themselves at 
higher production costs than can be purchased in the marketplace.  The answer is 
that using the market involves “transaction costs,” and that these costs can more 
than offset production cost advantages from outsourcing.  In making outsourcing 
decisions, it is important for management to consider not only the internal and 
external production costs of providing the good or service, but also the cost of 
managing the transaction internally or externally.  For example, consider DoD’s 
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA). This $1.1 billion organization is 
made up of 10,500 Civilians and 600 Military whose exclusive responsibility is to 
help manage and coordinate some 300,000 defense contracts valued at nearly $950 
billion.  
Transaction cost economics (TCE) emphasizes transaction costs (the cost of 
carrying out a transaction) in addition to traditional production costs. Transaction 
costs typically encountered organizations dealing with outside suppliers or sub-
contractors include the costs of source selection, periodic competition and 
renegotiation, contract management, and measuring and monitoring performance.  
Examples of transaction costs that occur inside an organization include the costs of 
hiring and managing employees and selecting and controlling equipment and 
materials.  TCE views organizations as a web of contractual relationships. Each 
relationship—the acquisition of an input, employment of a worker, the exchange of a 
product or service between supplier and customer—is a transaction. 
Transaction costs can be classified into two categories: coordination costs 
and motivation costs.  Coordination Costs include: 1) Search and Information 
Costs—to identify options and acquire timely, accurate and relevant information to 
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evaluate alternatives; 2) Bargaining and Decision Costs—to choose an alternative 
and negotiate and write a contract; and 3) Monitoring and Enforcement Costs—to 
make payments and measure, monitor, and evaluate performance.  Motivation Costs 
include: 1) Costs to promote productive effort and incentives to encourage 
investment (better, faster, cheaper) and 2) Costs to deter unproductive bargaining 
and costs of opportunistic behavior renegotiation). 
Four key characteristics of transactions can make them more costly: 
complexity, uncertainty, frequency, and asset specificity.  TCE suggests that an 
understanding of the key characteristics of a transaction can help decision-makers 
improve the design of contracts, organizations, and other governance structures that 
reduce transaction costs and improve the gains from an exchange between buyers 
and sellers.  In other words, understanding transaction costs may help the firm 
achieve results “faster, better, and cheaper.”  
While TCE offers an attractive theoretical foundation for competitive sourcing 
decisions in the private sector (e.g., Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1971; 1979; Alchian & 
Demsetz, 1972) it has been applied less often in a government setting (e.g., Pint & 
Baldwin, 1997; Williamson, 1999).  Many goods and services required for 
government operations can be provided through commercial markets.  The 
Department of Defense (DoD) relies heavily on outsourcing, particularly when 
producing weapon systems.  Franck & Melese (2005) apply TCE to federal 
outsourcing and note that transaction costs vary widely and depend in known ways 
upon the attributes of the outsourcing action.  
Although often used to refer to major weapon system programs, the term 
acquisition can cover all DoD purchases from the development and procurement of 
weapon systems, to purchasing of services and support for the military.  Franck, 
Melese & Dillard, (2006) extended the application of TCE to defense procurement.   
They examine the effect of “asset specificity” on acquisition programs.  The “lock-in” 
effect achieved by contractors that invest in specific assets, while benefiting the 
government in the short run, can haunt the government in the long run. The risk is 
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that, after winning a bidding competition, a contractor that invests in specific assets 
might eventually become a sole supplier that “holds up” the government, resulting in 
higher costs, schedule delays, or disappointing performance.  
B. Measuring Transaction Costs 
The primary insight of TCE is that correctly forecasting economic production 
costs of government purchases or acquisitions is necessary, but not sufficient. TCE 
emphasizes another set of costs—coordination and motivation costs, such as search 
and information costs; decision, contracting, and incentive costs; measurement, 
monitoring, and enforcement costs, etc. (Melese, Franck, Angelis & Dillard, 2007).  A 
focus on transaction costs can improve cost estimation for DoD acquisitions by (1) 
helping to explain the systematic bias observed in initial cost estimates, and (2) 
increasing the general explanatory power of cost estimations.  The traditional work 
breakdown structure (WBS) approach may overlook some important variables, 
resulting in initial cost estimates that are (1) not accurate and (2) biased toward 
being unrealistically low. Unlike the production-function approach of the WBS, the 
TCE approach focuses on coordination and motivation costs and other key 
components of major weapon system acquisitions (Angelis, Dillard, Franck & 
Melese, 2007).  
While there are several ways to define and characterize transaction costs, 
actually measuring them can be difficult.  Wang (2003) discusses a variety of 
empirical studies that attempt to measure transaction costs.  Some studies measure 
transaction costs directly by measuring the economic value of resources used in 
locating trading partners and executing transactions.  For example, for six months in 
the early 1990s, Ambassador Henry F. Cooper (1993; as cited in Spring, 2002, 
May), then director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, tracked the costs 
to support the attainment of one decision point in a single program, which was then 
called the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD).  Ambassador Cooper found 
that it took 75,000 government labor hours, 250,000 contractor labor hours, more 
than one ton of supporting documents, all at a cost of $22 million dollars.   
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Unfortunately, such costs are not routinely tracked by DoD.  Dillard (2005) 
noted that while some representatives from program management offices keep an 
accounting of travel and labor costs associated with program reviews, the evidence 
is mostly anecdotal.  His research suggests that a substantial amount of program 
office funding is expended on such items as government agency or support 
contractor assistance with supporting analyses and documentation, presentation 
materials, frequent travel to the Pentagon, and other associated expenses in 
preparation for high-level reviews. 
In earlier work (Angelis et al., 2007), we attempted to directly measure 
transactions costs for defense acquisition programs using the expenditures of the 
Program Management Office (PMO) as an approximate measure of the amount of 
transaction costs present in an acquisition program.  We found that DoD does not 
track PMO costs separately; therefore, measuring transaction costs directly or by 
proxy from the existing DoD data may not be possible.  As an alternative, it is 
possible to directly measure contractor Systems Engineering/Program Management 
(SEPM) costs as an indication of contractor transaction costs (Angelis et al., 2008).  
We calculated the ratio of SEPM to total costs for two case studies (Javelin and 
ATACMS) for which ex-ante indicators of transaction costs had been assessed.  The 
results are consistent in that the program with ex-ante indicators that suggested 
higher transaction costs also had a significantly higher SEPM ratio. 
Other empirical studies do not attempt to measure transaction costs directly.  
Instead, they use a variety of proxies, such as complexity, uncertainty, frequency, 
and asset specificity.  For example, Brown, Flowe and Hamel (2007) examine the 
role of complexity by measuring the difference in cost and schedule breaches 
between System-of-Systems (SoS) and single-system defense acquisition 
programs.  SoS programs are defined as independent systems that are integrated 
into a larger system to provide unique capabilities.  The identification of a program 
as SoS can be seen as a proxy for complexity.  We extended that work (Angelis et 
al., 2008) to coordination costs by comparing programs managed jointly by several 
services to programs managed by one service.  Joint programs can be seen as 
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proxy for coordination costs.  The use of these proxies provides useful insights into 
the effect of transaction costs. 
C. Principal-Agent Model  
Another way to look at transactions is to consider the problem that occurs 
when cooperating parties have different goals and division of labor (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Ross, 1973).  Agency theory examines the interaction between the 
party that delegates or contracts for work (the principal) and the party that agrees to 
perform the work (the agent).  The focus of the principle-agent model is on 
determining the optimal contract between the two parties.  There are two main 
problems that can arise in agency relationships: (1) the goals of the principal and 
agent are not aligned, and (2) the principal cannot easily verify what the agent is 
actually doing.  The theory can suggest which contract type is most effective under 
different assumptions. 
In the simplest case, the model assumes that principals and agents have 
conflicting goals & objectives, but an easily measured outcome.  This case also 
assumes that the agent is more risk-adverse than the principal, since the agent has 
only one contract (with the principal), while the principal can diversify his/her 
investments with several contracts.  The type of contract used can depend on the 
amount of information available to the principal (see Demski & Feltham, 1978).   
In many cases, there is information asymmetry because the principal does 
not know exactly what the agent has done.  In this situation, the agent (who 
accomplishes the work) has an information advantage over the principal.  This can 
lead to two problems discussed in agency theory: adverse selection and moral 
hazard.  Adverse selection can occur if agents misrepresent their ability to 
accomplish the work.  This might provide one explanation for why contractors often 
fail to deliver weapon systems on time, within budget and as specified.  A moral 
hazard can arise if the agent chooses not to perform as promised and the principal 
has no way of knowing.  For example, a contractor may bill for a service that was not 
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actually rendered or bill for an amount in excess of actual costs.  The moral hazard 
occurs because the principal is unable or unwilling to verify the agent’s effort. 
One way the principal can deal with lack of information is to invest in data-
collection systems such as budgeting systems, cost-accounting systems and 
performance-measurement systems.  The principal can also establish reporting 
procedures such as programmatic and technical reviews, as well as additional layers 
of oversight, as shown in Figure 1 below for defense acquisition programs.  
 
Figure 1. Four Tiers of Major Program Reporting  
(NRC, 2009) 
Note: The meaning of each acronym is as follows: DAE, Defense Acquisition Executive; USD 
(AT&L), Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; SECAF, 
Secretary of the Air Force; CSAF, Chief of Staff of the Air Force; MAJCOM HQ, Major 
Command Headquarters; SAE, Service Acquisition Executive, SAF/AQ, Assistant Secretary 
of the Air Force for Acquisition; PEO, Program Executive Officer; PM, Program Manager 
In addition, the principal may use a contract that specifies the desired 
outcome (as opposed to effort or behavior) to align goals and incentives.  Such an 
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arrangement transfers the risk of performance to the agent.  For example, the 
government can use firm, fixed-price contracts to acquire goods and services.  Such 
contracts place the responsibility of performance on the contractor or supplier and 
reduce the cost and schedule risk to the government.  Naturally, contractors may 
charge a premium to accept additional risk and, in some cases, may refuse the 
contract altogether.  This may happen if there are too many factors beyond the 
contractor’s control and the consequences of failure are too high. 
Principal-agent theory can be applied to the buyer-supplier relationship that 
exists in defense acquisitions, as well as to the sponsor-developer relationship that 
exists between Congress and DoD.  Agents are responsible for accomplishing the 
work, but have more information about the uncertainties of execution than the 
principal.  Program managers (PM) can find themselves acting as both a principal 
and an agent.  When reporting to Congress, OSD, and the Defense Acquisition 
Board (DAB), the PM acts as the agent, providing information on the status of the 
work (cost, schedule and performance) through programmatic reviews.  When 
dealing with the contractor or supplier, the PM plays the role of the principal, 
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As can be seen in Figure 2, the PM must respond to many principals.  The 
existence of multiple principals strongly indicates that not all the principals will agree 
on goals. Goal conflict among principals makes the relationship between principals 
and agents exceedingly complex (Waterman & Meier, 1998).  Each of the principals 
(Congress, DOD, and the military services) has created an intricate web of laws, 
directives, and organizations to control the agents' actions. Acquisition reform efforts 
have focused on altering these rules and organizational roles, including increasing 
the authority of certain players in the acquisition process to alter the incentives. In 
particular, reformers designed initiatives to increase the information flow to the 
principals and to improve the quality of the information (Biery, 1992).   
TCE assumes that economic actors—say government “principals” and 
defense industry “agents” in an outsourcing relationship—are motivated to look 
ahead, recognize potential hazards, and factor these into contracts or organizational 
design.  The challenge is to design contracts, incentive schemes, monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms, and to adopt other governance arrangements (property 
rights, reputation, bonding, warranties, etc.) that allow for credible commitments ex-
ante and that promote mutual compliance ex-post (Williamson, 1983).  Prendergast 
(1999) provides a valuable overview of principal-agent models that highlights the 
costs and consequences of various incentive mechanisms designed to address 
internal coordination and motivation issues.
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III. The Program Manager’s Perspective 
A. Program Oversight 
As noted earlier, the Department of Defense, for the most part, commissions 
external suppliers to conduct projects for its internal use, including the development 
and production of major weapon systems.  Naturally, there are transaction costs 
associated with these relationships such as search, information, decision, 
contracting, measurement, monitoring, and enforcement costs.   
DoD relies on a cadre of military and civilian officials—known as program 
managers—to lead the development and delivery of hundreds of weapon systems 
and subsystems.  The systems that program managers are responsible for range 
from highly sophisticated air-, land-, sea-, and space-based systems to smaller, less 
complex communications or support equipment that interconnects or supports larger 
systems. Program managers are responsible for assuring that these systems are 
reliable, affordable, supportable, and effective. They carry out multiple roles and 
responsibilities and are expected to have a working knowledge in such diverse areas 
as contracting, budgeting, systems engineering, and testing (GAO, 2005).   
In addition to reporting to Congress, OSD and the DAB and monitoring the 
contractor or supplier (as shown in Figure 2), program managers must also work 
with other organizations that can influence the success of their program.  These 
organizations include the Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) at OSD (which 
provides independent cost estimates to overcome moral hazard issues), the 
developmental and operational test centers, the budgeting and comptroller 
organizations that work with funding, the ultimate user of the weapon system (the 
warfighter that defines the desired capabilities), as well as other organizations, 
including other services interested in joint interoperability issues.   
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As shown in Figure 1 above, program managers report to a Program 
Executive Officer (PEO)—a civilian at the senior executive level or military officer at 
the general officer rank—who typically manages a portfolio of related weapon 
systems.  The PEO reports to the Service Acquisition Executive (SAE), a civilian 
(often a political appointee) who reports to the service Secretary.  The Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD/AT&L) is the 
Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) with full responsibility for supervising the 
performance of the DoD Acquisition System.  As the chair of the Defense Acquisition 
Board (DAB), USD(AT&L) is the final decision authority for major defense acquisition 
programs.  DoD classifies acquisition programs into categories based upon a 
number of factors such as their size, cost, complexity and importance. Table 1 
shows the major defense acquisition categories along with the corresponding 
decision authority. 
Table 1. Major Defense Acquisition Categories (FY2000 dollars) 
(DoD, 2008, December 8). 
Acquisition category  Definition  Decision Authority 
 
Category I  
 
Research, development, test, and 
evaluation > $365M  





1C: Head of DoD Component or, if 
delegated, the Component 
Acquisition Executive (CAE) 
 
Category II  
 
Research, development, test, and 
evaluation > $140M  
Procurement > $660M  
 
 
Component Acquisition Executive 
or individual designated by CAE 
 
Category III  
 
No fiscal criteria 
 
Designated by CAE 
 
In 2005, GAO conducted a survey of acquisition category I and II program 
managers to gather information about their perceptions of factors that assist or block 
their success and to help define other issues in the DoD acquisition process that 
affect program manager effectiveness.  According to the GAO, many program 
managers expressed frustration with the time required of them to answer continual 
demands for information from oversight officials—many of which did not seem to add 
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value. Some program managers, in fact, estimated that they spent more then 50% of 
their time producing and tailoring and explaining status information to others.  More 
broadly, many program managers and program executive officials said that they did 
not believe that DoD’s acquisition process really supported or enabled them. 
Instead, they viewed the process as cumbersome and the information produced as 
non-strategic (GAO, 2005). 
In addition, GAO found that program managers believe that they are not 
sufficiently supported once programs begin. In particular, they believe that program 
decisions are based on funding needs of other programs rather than demonstrable 
knowledge; they lack tools needed to enable them to provide leadership consistent 
with cost, schedule and performance information; they are not trusted; they are not 
encouraged to share bad news; and they must continually advocate for their 
programs in order to sustain DoD commitment (GAO, 2005). 
B. Program Reviews 
The DoD acquisition process is based on a series of milestone decisions that 
are supported by different levels of program reviews intended to give the program 
manager and DoD leadership the information they need to make decisions.  Table 2 
illustrates the review process over the life of an acquisition program.
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Table 2. Example of the Timing and Levels of Reviews  
over the Life of a Defense Acquisition Program  
 
Note: CD = Concept Development, CR = Concept Refinement, A, B & C = Milestone A, B & C, 
LRIP = Low Rate Initial Production, FRP = Full Rate Production  
(see appendix for a review of applicable acronyms) 
In a study examining the various iterations of the DoD 5000 Series 
regulations governing acquisition programs, Dillard (2005) noted that both the 
number and level of reviews conducted over the years have increased substantially, 
particularly when taking into account the array of pre-briefs and informational 
meetings held in support of the formal reviews.   He observed that program reviews 
of any kind at the OSD level have a significant impact on program management 
offices. Much documentation must be prepared and many preparatory meetings are 
conducted before the ultimate review. And while efforts to prepare for non-milestone 
reviews are generally considered to be lesser in scope, a considerable amount of 
effort managing the decision process is still expended by the program manager.  
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These findings were confirmed in a recent study commissioned by the Air 
Force (NRC, 2009).  A committee of the National Academy of Sciences—which 
included one of the co-authors of this report (John Dillard)—found that the number of 
program reviews is growing and that the reviews “most certainly” add to program 
costs.  Of most concern to the committee was that “the proliferation of reviews does 
not appear to have had a positive effect on program cost and schedule outcomes.”  
The committee also recognized that there is a significant amount of preparation and 
coordination required for reviews—both vertically in their conduct at multiple levels of 
responsibility, and horizontally across adjacent staff offices. 
The program manager plays a central role in the acquisition process, 
participating in all reviews (and pre-briefs) for multiple principals.  All of the reviews, 
both formal and informal, must be supported by the program management office and 
require substantial resources. Not only government resources are expended in 
preparing and presenting reviews, but often contractor personnel are involved as 
well. Although each individual review is intended to serve a specific purpose, the 
overall magnitude of the review efforts not only significantly increase the workload of 
the program office in terms of direct support, but also divert attention from day-to-
day management of the program (NRC, 2009).  
There are two basic categories of program reviews: technical and 
programmatic.  Technical reviews are focused on the performance of the system 
being acquired, while programmatic reviews are more oversight in nature. 
The Defense Acquisition University (DAU) defines a technical review as an 
event at which the progress of the technical effort is assessed relative to its 
governing plans and technical requirements. Technical reviews are key decision 
events used to measure technical progress and maturity in system development.  
DoD Instruction 5000.02, Enclosure 12, paragraph 4 (DoD, 2008, December 8), 
directs that technical reviews of program progress be event driven and conducted 
when the system under development meets the review entrance criteria as 
documented in the Systems Engineering Plan.
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The Interim Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAU, 2009), chapter 4, section 
4.3.3.4, lists the following technical reviews as part of the systems engineering 
process: 
 Technology development phase: 
– System Requirements Review 
– System Functional Review 
– System Preliminary Design Review 
 Engineering and manufacturing development phase: 
– Integrated Baseline Review 
– Critical Design Review 
– Test Readiness Review 
– Flight Readiness Review  
– System Verification Review  
– Functional Configuration Audit  
– Production Readiness Review 
– Technology Readiness Assessment  
Technical reviews serve as forums for problem discovery and assessment of 
technical progress toward system performance goals. Sharing of information 
horizontally is key in these integrative reviews.  They are typically chaired by the 
program manager and conducted locally—often in the prime or system contractor 
location—and are scheduled and conducted at the program manager’s discretion 
when appropriate (event or progress-based vs. calendar-based).  Technical reviews 
are also used as oversight tools by the program manager (as principal) to monitor 
the technical progress of the system prime contractor and subcontractors (agents). 
DAU defines “programmatic” as pertaining to the cost, schedule, and 
performance characteristics of an acquisition program (2005).  This definition would 
distinguish programmatic reviews from technical reviews in that technical reviews 
are primarily concerned with performance issues of the system, while programmatic 
reviews are concerned with the performance of the acquisition process. 
Programmatic reviews can be thought of as those reviews dealing with non-technical 
issues such as cost, schedule, budget, quantities, contracts and program 
management, as well as performance.  Programmatic reviews consider performance 
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issues, but at a higher level and in the context of the overall program management 
process. 
Although programmatic reviews are often scheduled and conducted 
according to prearranged milestone dates or per an “acquisition baseline” 
established by program manager and multi-level staffs well in advance, they can be 
held “on call” or ad hoc as program issues arise.  They are formal in nature, 
convened and chaired by higher echelons (program executive officer, service-level 
acquisition executive, Office of the Secretary of Defense staff, and Milestone 
Decision Authority/Defense acquisition executive), and information within them flows 
vertically.  Programmatic reviews are designed to inform key staff members in the 
Pentagon and Congress (the principals) about the business and technical progress 
of programs.  Decisions based on programmatic reviews can determine the fate of a 
program—allowing it to proceed on course, sometimes directing a change in course, 
or in some cases, catalyzing the termination of the program.  These types of reviews 
have increased significantly in both frequency and in their level of management 
oversight. 
In 2005, GAO noted that DOD program managers operate under many layers 
of oversight—both internally and externally. While much of the oversight is 
necessary for carrying out stewardship responsibilities for public money, GAO’s 
researchers pointed out that studies conducted by a variety of commissions 
assessing acquisition problems through the years have consistently found that there 
are opportunities to reduce oversight layers and streamline oversight processes. 
Program managers (as agents) understand the need for oversight, but responding to 
oversight demands can take too much of their time.  The next section discusses the 
findings of a recent study that tried to address the same issues. 
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C. National Research Council Survey 
In 2008, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Science, 
Technology, and Engineering asked the National Research Council (NRC) to (1) 
review and assess the increasing number of prescribed program reviews and 
assessments that US Air Force space and non-space acquisition programs in all 
Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition categories are required to undergo, and 
(2) to recommend ways to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of those program 
reviews in terms of their goals, objectives, content, and requirements. The 
Committee on Optimizing US Air Force and DoD Review of Air Force Acquisition 
Programs was formed in May 2008 to conduct this review (NRC, 2009). 
The committee was asked to address a key question: Can changes in the 
number, content, sequence, or conduct of program reviews help program managers 
more successfully execute their programs?  Specifically, the committee was tasked 
by the Air Force to: review the program management and the technical reviews and 
assessments that US Air Force space and non-space system acquisition programs 
are required to undergo; assess each review in terms of resources required and its 
role and contribution; identify cases in which different reviews have common or 
overlapping goals, content, or requirements; identify and evaluate options for 
streamlining, tailoring, integrating, or consolidating reviews of programs to increase 
cost-effectiveness and to lessen the workforce impact of the reviews as a whole; and 
recommend changes that the Air Force and the Department of Defense should 
make.   
Because data and metrics on program reviews are not collected by DoD, the 
committee was unable to determine the overlap or duplication of different reviews.  
The committee was also unable to determine specific resources required to 
accomplish each review, although answers to the survey and information gathered 
from the interviews suggested that 10-30% of a PM’s time is spent supporting 
reviews.    
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The committee gathered information from presentations, interviews, and 
previous studies.  It also developed a detailed qualitative survey that went out to 
over 80 USAF program managers to gauge their participation in and overall 
assessment of both programmatic and technical reviews, focusing upon the value as 
well as the costs of reviews.  
In surveys and interviews conducted by the GAO in 2005, program managers 
and program executive officers frequently commented that they spend too much 
time preparing data for oversight purposes that are not strategic or very useful to 
them. GAO noted that more than 90% of survey respondents said they spent either 
a moderate, great, or very great extent of their time representing their program to 
outsiders and developing and generating information about program progress.   
After reviewing studies conducted over the past decade, the committee 
reported that it could find no evidence of earlier work that focused on the impact of 
the overall formal and informal review process on the acquisition system in terms of 
resources spent by the program office or the effect of diverting a program manager’s 
attention from the day-today management of his or her programs.  Accordingly, the 
committee decided to examine the costs of reviews in terms of the amount of time 
the program manager spends supporting reviews. 
The committee surveyed Air Force PMs and PEOs to collect quantitative and 
qualitative information on the impact of external reviews on program execution—
including the time and effort spent preparing for, participating in, and following up on 
actions resulting from tasks from higher-level AF and OSD reviews—that would not 
otherwise have had to be spent for the purpose of good program management. The 
survey also asked about PM and PEO assessments of the value of the reviews.
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The survey was divided into four sections: 
Section 1:   Demographic Data (information on program manager and 
program) 
Section 2:   Program Activity Overview (information on pertinent external 
reviews/reporting accomplished by the program) 
Section 3:   Questions on Specific Reviews (information on time/effort spent 
on specific reviews/reporting accomplished by each program 
manager taking the survey)  
Section 4:   Optional Section (to comment on streamlining, tailoring, 
integrating and consolidating opportunities) 
The committee concluded that there may not be sufficient data to permit a 
quantitative response to the key question raised in the summary—namely, can 
changes in the number, content, sequence, or conduct of program reviews help the 
program manager more successfully execute the program?  Instead, the committee 
made five recommendations which it believes will provide greater control of the 
review process. 
D. Implications of Theory 
Transaction cost economics and the principal-agent model suggest several 
interesting questions that might be addressed by analyzing the data gathered in the 
NRC PM survey: 
1. Can we use the PM survey to quantify oversight and monitoring costs? 
2. Is there a difference in the perceived cost/benefit of oversight and 
monitoring activities when the program manager acts as the: 
a. Principal (technical reviews)? 
b. Agent (programmatic reviews)? 
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This study attempts to answer these questions.  In our analysis, we assume 
that subjective perceptions of relative cost/benefit of reviews provide useful insights 
into transaction costs.  We start with the assumption that program managers are 
more likely to: 
 View technical reviews as less costly/more beneficial 
 View programmatic reviews as more costly/less beneficial 
The results of our analysis are presented in the next section. 
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IV. Data Analysis 
A. Survey Data 
The data used for this analysis is based on responses to the AF NRC 
Program Manager Survey (NRC, 2009).  The only data available from the survey 
report is in summary form (i.e., the total response count for each question is 
available but not the individual responses).  We limited our analysis to Section 2 of 
the survey—Program Activity Overview—which provided information on pertinent 
external reviews/reporting accomplished by programs.  This was the only section of 
the survey that lent itself to meaningful analysis given the limitations of summarized 
data. 
Each of the questions selected for our analysis lists the nine reviews in Table 
1 and asks the respondent to answer in terms of those reviews.  Survey participants 
were also allowed to write-in other reviews, but to make the data more comparable, 
we did not use the write-in answers in our analysis.  We divided the survey data into 
two categories: technical reviews and programmatic reviews (as shown in Table 3). 
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Table 3. Technical and Programmatic Reviews 
* The AF study categorized IPA as technical, but our subject-matter expert felt that 
the IPA had enough business aspects to be more accurately characterized as 
Programmatic. 
The questions selected for our analysis are the following: 
2.2 For each of these major program reviews/assessments that your 
program experienced, indicate your assessment of their impact on 
program performance (i.e., cost/schedule/ technical performance 
accomplishment)? 
2.2a Which single review had the greatest positive impact on program 
performance? 
2.4 Higher-level HQ AF/OSD reviews/assessments provide senior leaders 
information that is necessary for their understanding of program 
performance, to fulfill their oversight role.  Please rate each of the 
reviews that your program experienced in terms of how effective you 
believe the structure/format of the review was at providing useful data 
to the senior AF and OSD leadership. 
2.5 From the list below, identify the three higher-level HQ AF/OSD 
reviews/reporting activities that you believe have the LEAST beneficial 
impact on program performance.  Respondents indicated the least, 




Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) Milestone 
Review 
Technology Maturity Assessment 
(TMA) 
Defense Space Acquisition Board (DSAB) 
Milestone Review 
Manufacturing Readiness Review 
(MRR) 
Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) Status 
Review 
System Engineering Assessment 
Model (SEAM) 
Defense Space Acquisition Board (DSAB) 
Status Review 
 Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT) 
Review 
 Independent Program Assessment (IPA) * 
 Program Support Review (PSR) 
 Logistics Health Assessment (LHA) 
 Air Force Review Board (AFRB) 
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2.7 From what you know from any source, identify the program reviews 
that have the highest potential to be combined into a single useful 
review.  Respondents were asked to select from the list of reviews in 
Table 1 and use the write-in section to show the pairings/groupings. 
Only a few of the respondents used the write-in section, so it was not 
part of our analysis. 
2.12 For the following major reviews, please indicate your opinion about 
whether the documentation required by higher authorities to support 
each of the following reviews is Insufficient (In), About Right (AR), 
Excessive but Decreasing(E-D), Excessive and Steady (E-S), 
Excessive and Increasing (E-I).  For purposes of our analysis, E-D, E-
S and E-I were grouped into one category: Excessive. 
B. Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses are tested (the survey question corresponding to 
each hypothesis is shown in parentheses): 
1. The perceived value (impact) of technical reviews is higher than the 
value of program reviews.  (2.2 and 2.2a) 
2. Technical reviews are more likely to be rated as helpful (provide useful 
data) than program reviews.  (2.4) 
3. Technical reviews are more likely to be perceived as beneficial than 
program reviews.  (2.5) 
4. Technical reviews are more likely to be perceived as well structured 
(less likely to be combined with other reviews) than program reviews.  
(2.7) 
5. The perceived cost (level of documentation required) of program 
reviews is significantly higher than the cost of technical reviews.  (2.12) 
C. Statistical Analysis 
The proportions (relative frequency) of responses in the two categories 
(technical and programmatic) are examined in two ways: 
a)  A Chi-squared test is performed on the contingency table for each 
question (where applicable) to determine if the counts in the rows 
(answers) and columns (review type) can be considered independent. 
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b)   A z-test of the difference between the proportions in each category is 
used to determine if there is statistically significant difference in the 
proportions at the .05 level.  A one-tailed test is used to determine if 
the proportion of technical responses is significantly higher than the 
proportion of programmatic responses.  The one-tailed test of the 
reverse (proportion of programmatic responses is greater than 
technical responses) is also shown. 
c)   A z-test of the difference between the proportion of technical 
responses vs. the expected frequency (based on the number of 
technical reviews in the survey, 4 out of 13 or p = .3077) is used to 
determine if the level of responses is statistically significant at the .05 
level. 
The results of the tests are summarized in Table 4. 
Table 4. Summary of Statistical Test Results 
(Aggregated responses are shown in italics) 










2.2    0.0939    
 Positive Impact 20 46   0.8402 0.1598 0.5328 
 No Impact 27 34   0.0205 0.9795 0.0112 
 Negative Impact 5 18   0.9216 0.0784 0.8260 
 Positive or No Impact 47 80   0.0784 0.9216 0.0639 
2.2a  10 27       0.3955 
2.4    0.0907      
 Lots of Useful Data 14 25  0.3720 0.6280 0.2439 
 Some Useful Data 19 58   0.9892 0.0108 0.8767 
 Little Useful Data 14 18   0.0912 0.9088 0.0558 
 No Useful Data 9 9   0.0611 0.9389 0.0386 
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 Lots or Some Useful Data 33 83   0.9859 0.0141 0.7060 
 Little or No Useful Data 23 27   0.0141 0.9859 0.0098 
2.4A    0.0572    
 Lots of Useful Data 8 31   0.9754 0.0246 0.9174 
 Some Useful Data 19 44   0.7571 0.2429 0.5419 
 Little Useful Data 12 14   0.0640 0.9360 0.0446 
 No Useful Data 12 13   0.0445 0.9555 0.0310 
 Lots or Some Useful Data 27 75   0.9946 0.0054 0.8266 
 Little or No Useful Data 24 27   0.0054 0.9946 0.0500 
2.5    0.4382    
 Least Beneficial 17 23  0.5014 0.4986 0.0540 
 Second-least Beneficial 18 18  0.8657 0.1343 0.0062 
 Third-least Beneficial 13 24  0.1353 0.8647 0.2825 
 Least or second-least 35 41  0.1353 0.8647 < 0.0001 
2.7  66 74      < 0.0001 
2.12    0.1997    
 Insufficie nt 6 5  0.0650 0.9350 0.0438 
 About Right 42 76  0.2542 0.7458 0.1281 
 Excessive 40 94  0.8969 0.1031 0.5912 
 Insufficient or About Right 48 81   0.1031 0.8969 0.0565 
 
D. Results of Statistical Analysis 
The significant results of the analysis are discussed for each of the questions: 
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2.2   Technical reviews are significantly more likely to be seen as having no 
impact on program performance and are somewhat less likely to be 
seen as having a negative impact on program performance. 
2.4   There were two set of responses for question 2.4 (both are shown in 
Table 2).  Both sets indicate that programmatic reviews are 
significantly more likely to be seen as providing some or lots of useful 
data, while technical reviews are significantly more likely to be seen as 
providing little or no useful data. 
2.5 Of the reviews identified as being least or second least beneficial, the 
proportion of technical reviews is significantly higher than expected 
based on the number of technical reviews in the survey—indicating 
that technical reviews are more likely to be seen as least or second-
least beneficial. 
2.7 Of the reviews identified as having the highest potential for being 
combined into one review, the proportion of technical reviews is 
significantly higher than the proportion of technical reviews in the 
survey—indicating that technical reviews are more likely to be 
identified as candidates for consolidation. 
2.12 Of the technical reviews identified as requiring insufficient 
documentation, the proportion of technical reviews is significantly 
higher than the proportion of reviews in the survey—indicating that 
technical reviews are more likely to be seen as not having enough 
documentation.   
E. Interpretation of Results 
Based on our initial analysis, we can draw the following conclusions from the 
test results: 
1.   Program managers do not see significantly more value in technical 
reviews than they see in programmatic reviews. However, they do 
seem to feel that technical reviews are somewhat less harmful (have 
less of a negative impact on program performance) than programmatic 
reviews.  When acting as principals in technical reviews, they probably 
see the review as necessary for making sure the program stays on 
course; thus, it should have a positive impact on program performance.  
On the other hand, the programmatic reviews may be more likely to 
reveal negative information such as cost overruns or schedule delays 
that have a negative impact on program performance.  In addition, 
when they are acting as agents providing information to senior 
leadership, the program managers may feel that programmatic reviews 
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are more likely to expose the program to higher-level criticism or 
interference. 
2.   Program managers were asked to rate the usefulness of information 
provided by reviews to senior leaders.  Thus, they answered question 
2.4 from the perspective of the senior leadership.  From this 
perspective, it makes sense that senior leaders would find 
programmatic reviews more useful and technical reviews less useful.  
Senior leadership is more interested in the overall program 
performance, including cost and schedule as well as technical issues.  
At the higher levels of OSD and AF, the technical issues are left to the 
program manager to fix; they only become important when they 
significantly impact the overall performance of the program. 
3.   In terms of reporting to higher-level authorities, program managers see 
technical reviews as providing less benefit to their programs.  This 
makes sense given the previous finding that the information provided 
by technical reviews is less useful to senior leaders than the 
information in programmatic reviews.  Less-useful data leads to lower 
impact and less benefit to the program. 
4.   Given that program managers see the information in technical reviews 
as being less useful to senior leaders, it makes sense that they would 
identify more technical reviews as those needing to be consolidated—
perhaps to increase the usefulness of the information provided, or 
perhaps to simply reduce the amount of information reported and make 
the reviews more efficient. 
5.   Program managers believe higher-level authorities do not require 
sufficient documentation for technical reviews.  This may be related to 
the usefulness of the information.  Perhaps more documentation is 
required to properly explain and illustrate the technical issues so that 
higher-level authorities can fully appreciate them.  Or it may be that 
program managers are much more involved in managing the technical 
issues and, therefore, are more aware of ways to document and 
support technical reviews vs. programmatic issues.
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V. Conclusion and Further Research 
This study continued ongoing efforts by the authors to understand and 
measure transactions costs within DoD acquisitions.  The principle-agent model was 
presented to help understand the program manager’s role in defense acquisitions.  
We analyzed data from an NRC survey of USAF program managers to gain insights 
into oversight and monitoring costs both when the program manager acts as a 
principal and as an agent.   
One of the interesting observations from our analysis of the NRC survey was 
that program managers found some real value in some of their programmatic 
reviews, despite the fact that such reviews are usually viewed as excessive and 
burdensome levels of oversight.  While surely much will be relative to individual 
project circumstances, program managers may find themselves genuinely pleased 
and relieved when such reviews are over and the needed decisions have been 
obtained.  Insofar as they may be spending more time on the decision bureaucracy 
than overseeing the technical and business efforts of their program, this 
management of government requirements and resources is, nonetheless, essential 
to program success. Thus, when bureaucratic reviews for decision-making become 
as critical as other items of scope in the project, they can easily be perceived as 
valuable when completed. In essence, programmatic reviews (being off-core 
activities to the more central scope of the project) evolve into actual scope—with a 
budget (or at least a cost) and a schedule to accomplish each review, and with 
measures of performance (or effectiveness) dependent upon their outcome. 
The lesser value given to technical reviews was counterintuitive.  Our 
expectation was that since program managers use the information in technical 
reviews on a day-to-day basis, they would find such reviews more useful than 
programmatic reviews.  A possible explanation is that they are typically deliverable 
products under the program’s system development contract, and the measure of 
quality in performance might vary between programs depending upon how much 
emphasis the government-industry management team applies to them. While the 
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program manager typically chairs each review, the presentations are made by the 
system prime contractor and his subcontractors. If, in fact, technical reviews serve to 
usefully inform the development team at the various points at which they are 
conducted, they will have served their intended purpose.  But if, in fact, the reviews 
are conducted as mere formalities to “check the block” on their fulfillment, they will 
be regarded as such—particularly if the program manager is well aware of the 
issues presented. 
Unfortunately, we were not given access to the raw data gathered through the 
NRC survey, only summarized responses.  Without the raw data, it was impossible 
to analyze important information about specific reviews gathered in Section 3 of the 
survey.  Section 3 asked the respondent to answer more questions for a selected 
review (based on answers to Section 2).  This is the most interesting set of answers, 
but basically useless in summary form because a reader can’t determine to which 
review the answers correspond.   
The raw data would allow us to do further research into the cost/benefit of 
specific reviews—such research may provide insights into the effectiveness of 
incentives and the principal-agent relationships in DoD acquisitions. 
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Review Acronyms 
AFRB  Air Force Review Board 
ASP  Acquisition Strategy Panel 
ASR   Alternative System Review 
CDR   Critical Design Review 
CSB   Configuration Steering Board 
DRR  Design Readiness Review  
IBR  Integrated Baseline Review 
ITR   Initial Technical Review 
FCA  Functional Configuration Audit 
OIPT   Overarching Integrated Product Team 
OTRR  Operational Test Readiness Review 
PDR   Preliminary Design Review 
PSR   Program Support Review 
SFR   System Functional Review 
SR   System Review 
SRR   System Requirements Review 
TRA   Technology Readiness Assessment 
TRR   Test Readiness Review 
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